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A. Introduction 
The state contends in this appeal that where the victim gives the 
defendant money with the specific understanding that the money will be paid 
over to a third party for a specific purpose, the defendant commits theft by 
unauthorized control where, instead of accomplishing that specific purpose, he 
appropriates the money to himself. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-11.) Thus, when 
Beaudry gave Johnson money so Johnson could buy four motorcycles on 
Beaudry's behalf, the only authorized use of the money was the motorcycle 
purchase and Johnson committed grand theft by unauthorized control when he 
appropriated the money. (ld.) Johnson responds by claiming he owned the 
money once it was turned over to him, and he therefore only defaulted on a 
contract. (Respondent's brief pp. 8-22.) Application of the correct legal 
standards, however, shows that where, as here, money is paid over in trust that it 
will be used for a specific purpose, the recipient of the money commits theft by 
unauthorized control when he appropriates the money for himself. Therefore, 
the jury verdict should be affirmed and the district court's order overturning that 
verdict was error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, we will uphold a judgment of 
conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence 
1 
could 
of the beyond a " 
154 Idaho 412,417,299 P.3d 219, 224 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). 
appellate court will not substitute its view "as to the credibility of the witnesses, 
the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence." State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 818, 186 P.3d 670, 
674 (Ct. App. 2008). 
C. Beaudry's Payment To Johnson For The Special Object Of Using The 
Money To Obtain Motorcycles Created A Bailment Over The Funds 
Intended For That Special Purpose 
The evidence supports the conclusion that Beaudry's delivery of money to 
Johnson was "in trust for the execution of a special object," namely for Johnson 
to purchase four motorcycles on Beaudry's behalf, and therefore the delivery of 
the funds created a bailment. See Bridge Tower Dental, P.A. v. Meridian 
Computer Center, Inc., 152 Idaho 569, 272 P.3d 541, (2012) (quoting Loomis v. 
Imperial Motors, Inc., 88 Idaho 74, 78, 396 P.2d 467, 469 (1964)). Because 
Johnson appropriated the money to his own purposes instead of using it for the 
special object for which he had been entrusted the funds, he committed theft by 
unauthorized control. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-11.) 
Johnson first asserts that his agreement with Beaudry did not require "that 
the check be deposited into a trust fund, by which the funds would be deemed to 
still be owned by Beaudry Motor Inc." (Respondent's brief, pp. 9-10.) While a 
contractual requirement to establish a separate trust fund would certainly have 
been evidence of the creation of bailment, Johnson cites no authority, and the 
2 
is unaware an is a a 
supra (defining 
reference to trust account); Loomis, supra (same). There is certainly nothing in 
the theft by unauthorized control statute, I.C. § 18-2403(3), that mentions trust 
accounts or limits thefts of cash by unauthorized control to circumstances where 
the cash was taken from a trust account. Because there is no element of the 
existence of a trust account in the statute, Johnson's argument is without legal 
basis. See Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, _, 315 P.3d 798, 809 (2013) (statutes 
must be interpreted according to their literal words). 
Johnson next argues that if the state is correct about him taking funds 
entrusted to him for a special purpose, and therefore creating a bailment, he is 
guilty of embezzlement. (Respondent's brief, p. 10.) This may be so. However, 
a prosecutor has charging discretion where two criminal statutes cover the same 
criminal act, so long as the statutes may be interpreted harmoniously. State v. 
Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 381-82, 987 P.2d 290, 293-94 (1999); State v. TrusdaU, 
2014 WL 503480 (idaho App., February 10, 2014). The two definitions of theft 
(embezzlement and theft by unauthorized control) are certainly harmonious. I.C. 
§ 18-2401 (1) ("Conduct denominated theft in this chapter constitutes a single 
offense .... "); see also State v. Sticklen, 136 Idaho 264, 269-70, 32 P.3d 158, 
163-64 (Ct. App. 2001) (reviewing both theft by unauthorized control and 
embezzlement theories of grand theft where defendant stole money from 
employer). That his offense could be characterized as both theft by 
3 
Johnson next contends he or his company obtained "unconditional 
ownership of the funds" because he received a check. (Respondent's brief, pp. 
11-13.) This argument fails both factually and legally. Factually the evidence 
established that Johnson agreed to accept the money under a contract whereby 
he received a commission and was required to use the remaining funds for the 
specific purpose of buying four motorcycles for Beaudry. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
1-3.) His receipt of the funds (other than his commission) therefore did have a 
condition: that they be used to purchase the motorcycles for Beaudry. The 
argument fails legally because Beaudry's act of paying by check instead of cash 
did not negate the terms or conditions under which the funds were delivered. 
The law cited by Johnson (I.C. §§ 28-3-104(1),28-3-106(1) (cited at Appellant's 
brief, p. 12)) meant only that Johnson had the right to cash the check. The state 
did not allege that he committed theft by cashing the check (or depositing the 
funds from the same into his account). Instead, it was Johnson's appropriation 
of funds after he deposited the check that constituted the theft. Johnson's 
argument that the use of a check as the method of payment eliminated all 
conditions in the contract and gave him greater claim to the money than if it had 
been paid in cash is meritless. 
Johnson next argues that someone who steals property after lawfully 
acquiring it does not commit theft by unauthorized control, citing State v. 
Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 945 P.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997), and State v. Culbreth, 
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1 , 1 App. . i 
already shown, cases do for 
Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) 
Under the common law the crime of larceny required that felonious intent 
coincide with a taking, but if felonious intent was formed after obtaining lawful 
possession the crime was embezzlement. State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 
P.2d 727 (1972). Johnson's argument that the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
reinstated the old common law larceny standard and applied it to all grand thefts 
(including embezzlement offenses) does not withstand scrutiny. Grand theft, 
unlike larceny, is not limited to taking, but also includes exercising unauthorized 
control. I.C. § 18-2403(3) ("takes or exercises unauthorized control over" 
(emphasis added)). Johnson was charged with exercising unauthorized control. 
(R., pp. 30-31.) That Johnson had no felonious intent upon receiving the money 
is irrelevant because he was not charged with unlawful taking; the relevant 
question was his intent when he exercised unauthorized control over the money. 
Johnson's argument that he had to have felonious intent at a time other than 
when he committed the criminal act for which he was charged is meritless. See 
I.C. § 18-114 (crime requires union of act and intent). 
1 Johnson also argues that the state failed to prove exactly where the money 
went (Respondent's brief, pp. 16-20), or exactly whom he stole it from 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 21-22). Johnson is apparently asserting these 
arguments as alternative bases for affirming the district court, because 
Johnson's factual claims regarding what the evidence shows is directly contrary 
to those articulated by the district court. (Tr., p. 93, L. 14 - p. 94, L. 18.) 
Because these arguments have neither factual merit nor ascertainable legal 
relevance the state is not responding to them in this brief. 
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a is is a 
restatement of the district court's conclusion that because Johnson the 
money in question pursuant to a legitimate contract, he could not have stolen the 
money when he later appropriated it. (See Tr., p. 269, Ls. 21-25.) While 
certainly not all breaches of contract are thefts, the fact that a defendant's theft 
also breached a contract does not insulate him from criminal accountability. The 
evidence demonstrated that Johnson received the money in question, except for 
a commission, in trust to perform a specific transaction that Beaudry could not 
himself perform. Johnson is no different from an attorney who receives a 
payment meant to settle a claim but instead keeps the money; a real estate 
agent who receives money to purchase a house but instead keeps the money; or 
a boy who receives money to buy a Christmas turkey but instead keeps the 
money. All of these would be theft. Johnson had authorized control over the 
money only to buy motorcycles for Beaudry. When he appropriated the money 
for himself he exercised unauthorized control. The district court erred and 
should be reversed. 
6 
reverse 
judgment of acquittal, the jury verdict, and for sentencing 
proceed ings. 
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